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RECENT CASES.
BANKRUPTCY-CHATTEL MORTGAGE-PERMITTING MORTGAGOR TO SELL.
IN RE HULL, 8 AM. B. R. 3o2.The claimant sold a stock of goods to the
bankrupt and, within the four months prior to petition, took a mortgage
back of those and other goods, leaving power to sell and replace goods
included in the mortgage. Held, that the District court must be governed
by the ruling of the Federal court, which held that mortgages with such
power of sale were fraudulent, rather than by the decision of the State
court, holding them valid.
This opinion seems wrong, both as to the law which should govern the
Bankruptcy court in its decision and as to the rule of the Federal courts
regarding liens of this nature. Against the unsupported contention that
the rule of the Federal court should govern, see Etherbridge v. Sperry,
39 U. S. 266; ln re Fall City Shirt Mfg. Co., 3 Colliers' Am. B. R. 437.
The latter case held that "the plain intention of Congress was to recognize
liens precisely as the State law had fixed them." The case of Robinson v.
Elliot, 22 Wall, 513, relied upon as authority in the present case to show
the position taken by the Federal courts that such liens are fraudulent,
does not, as explained by the later case of Etherbridge v. Sperry, supra,
establish any such rule, but rather that the validity of such mortgages will
be determined according to the circumstinces of each case, taken, in con-
nection with the law of the State in which the court sits. Means v. Dowd,
128 U. S. 273; Parker v. Moore, 115 Fed. 799; Peoples' Sazings Bank v.
Bates, 120 U. S. 556. In the latter case such a mortgage as the one in
question was held valid under the Michigan law.
BANKRUPTcy-DIsMISSAL OF INFANT'S PETITION TO BE ADJUDGED BANK-
RUPT.-IN RE PENZANSKY, 8 AM. B. R. 99 (MAss.).-Held, that an infant
may be the subject of a petition in bankruptcy if the debts from which
discharge is sought cannot be disaffirmed on coming of age, and that such
petition should not be dismissed.
In this country it has been held that an infant cannot be adjudged a
bankrupt in either voluntary or involuntary proceedings. In re Eidenmiller,
11o Fed. 594; In re Dugend, loo Fed. 274. In these cases, however, the
debts from which release was sought could be disaffirmed and it was
intimated that a petition of bankruptcy would be granted if the liability
had been for necessaries. See also In re Brice, 2 Am. B. R. 197, where the
court reaches a conclusion in accord with that of the principal case. In
England it has been an open question whether debt for necessaries would
support a petition in bankruptcy or not. In re Soltykoff, I Q. B. 415.
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT-ADvERSE CLAIMS TO
PROPERTY.-IN RE TUNE, 115 FED. 9o6.-Parties who held notes waiving
exemptions, levied on Tune's property. Several days later he was adjudi-
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cated a bankrupt. Held, that the referee may enjoin the creditors from
all further proceedings in the State courts against the bankrupt.
The older decisions hold that the assignee must defend actions against
the bankrupt in the court in which they were begun. Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S.
521. Since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the weight of authority is that
such actions should be brought in the District court, but there is some
doubt. Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524, holds that controversies
between the receiver and strangers should not be brought within the juris-
diction of the Federal courts without the consent of the strangers. Other
decisions hold that the District court obtains jurisdiction over all property
to which the adverse claim is merely colorable, and this seems the better
rule. Bryan v. Berilheieir, I8I U. S. i88; Muellcr v. Nugent, 22 Sup.
Ct. 269.
BASTARDY-RESEMBLANCE OF CHILD TO DEFENDANT-INTRODI'CTION OF
CHILD IN EVIDENCE.-KELLY V. STATE, 32 SO. 56 (ALA.).-Held, that a
bastard child may be introduced in evidence, to show his resemblance to
the defendant.
By the weight of authority, resemblance, as indicating that the de-
fendant is the parent of the child, is admissible in evidence; and to establish
it the child can be exhibited. Finnegan v. Dugan, 14 Allen 197; Guant v.
State, 50 N. J. L. 490; Whart., Ev., sec. 346. Contra, see Reitz v. Stat,
33 Ind. 187; Keniston v. Rowe, 16 Me. 38; Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wise. 84;
Beck, Med. fur., 615; although the reason assigned, the inconclusiveness
of such evidence, is hardly satisfactory. In Iowa the age of the child
determines the question. State v. Smith, 54 Iowa 104. In State v. Britt, 78
N. C. 479, the testimony of witnesses to the resemblance was permitted, but
this is generally denied. U. S. v. Collins, I Cranch 592. But as to the
analogous case of comparison of handwritings, see Wihart., EV'., sec. 708.
BOUNDARIES-LEGISLATIVE DETERMIINATION-CONcLUSIVENESS ON COURTS.
-CAMERON'S EX'RS V. STATE, 68 S. V. 5o8 ('Ex.).-The legislature in
1833 granted lands to Greer County for school purposes. Subsequently the
United States Supreme Court decided that Greer County was not, and never
had been, a part of Texas. Held. that the action of the lcg:-lature in
treating Greer County as a part of the State at the time the grant was
made is still conclusive on the courts, and such school lands cannot be
recovered from the grantee of the county on the ground that, as the county
was never a part of the State the grant was void.
The court relied upon Harrold z. Herington, 64 Tex. 233, and cases cited
therein. The decisions of the State courts which were quoted as authority for
the proposition that the judicial department could not limit the jurisdiction as-
serted by the political department are cases in which the boundary had not been
settled by the U. fi. Supreme Court. Statc V. l 3u;,well. R. . :28; Bedell
v. Loomis, It N. I . 15. In tie following caces the controur-y r-,,e Out of
questions of national and not of State boundary. Fosthr v. ,t ":.. _ Pet.
253; U. S. v. Arr,'dondo, 6 Pet. 091. The court disr~.ardt'd th.-: di-tinc-
lions. There is much authority on tht ot'tr i(e th qvlet.oln. it
appears that the legislature never had juri,,lictioi over Greer Cunoy. hence
all acts in relation thereto were void. 'ortit v. Sh, ly. it8 1:. S. 434.
Legi.,lative authority of a State nwst ,)end its furce % ithin its territorial
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limits. Cooley, Const. Lim., 5th ed., 151; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 163.
The case is in analogy to grants to fictitious persons which have repeatedly
been held void. Moffatt v. U. S., 112 U. S. 31; Wash., Real Property 265.
BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-REQUEST TO PERFORM-REFUSAL.-CLARK
v. COREY, 52 ATL. 81I (R. I.).-The defendant on account of sickness caused
by drunkenness was unable to marry plaintiff on the day set. Without
any further communication between them in regard to marriage, suit was
brought for breach of promise. Held, that the plaintiff having made no
offer or request, the defendant's failure to offer to marry after the day set
did not amount to a refusal constituting a breach. Tillinghast, J., dissenting.
When the day set had passed, the promise became a general one, which
the law construes to be performed upon request. Kelly v. Renfro, 9 Ala. 325.
if the plaintiff has made no request or offer, a refusal must be shown on
the part of the defendant. Cole zv. Halliday, 4 Mo. App. 98; Coil v. Tallace,
24 N. J. L. 291. The dissenting opinion lays stress on a quotation from
Seymour v. Gortsidc, 2 Dowl. & Ry. 55; "if after an engagement to marry,
and the lapse of the time agreed upon, the gentleman omits to offer to marry,
it is generally considered a refusal." But the weight of the English cases
as well as the American is contra. Gough v. Far, 2 Car. & P. 631.
CARRIERS-EJECTION OF PASSENGER-USE OF TICKET ON DAY ISSUED.-
GEORGIA R. Co. v. BALDONI, 42 S. E. 364 (GA.).-Held, that a notice in a
railroad station to the effect that tickets must be used on day issued is not
notice to a passenger, unless it is shown that he had read the notice or was
directed to. and that an ejection from a train because a ticket was two days
old was unjustified.
A railroad company has the right to provide and insist that passenger
tickets shall be used upon the day issued, but such condition should be
endorsed upon the ticket, or notice given to passenger. Elmore v. Sand,
54 N. Y. 512; Hill v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 63 N. Y. 1oI. One
cannot be held to contracts of this nature where they know nothing of the
condition, and to which they had not expressly or impliedly assented.
Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264; Rawson v. Penn. R. R. Co., 48 X. Y. 212.
COVENANT OF WARRANTY-MAINTENANCE OF DmSION WALL-BREAC.-
ENSIGN ET AL. V. COLT, 52 ATL. 829 (CoNN.).-Held, a right in an adjoining
owner, enforced by injunction, to maintenance of wall half of which is on
grantee's land constitutes breach of the covenant of warranty to grantee.
Hamersley and Prentice, JJ., dissenting.
Some courts hold broadly that a right in a third party to an easement
in property granted, when enforced, may constitute breach of covenant of
Warranty. Harlow v. Thomas, 15 Pick. 66; Lamb v. Danforth, 59 Me. 322.
But contra, if easement is consistent with ownership and possession of land
conveyed, there is no breach. Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 498. Also, if
easement is open and visible, and of a continuous character; Patterson v.
Arthurs, 9 Watts 154; or if easement is mutual and a benefit. Hendricks v.
Stark, 37 N. Y. io6. The great diversity in the decisions seems due to
the widely different views courts take of the nature and scope of the
covenants of warranty and against incumbrances. No uniform rule as to
their construction appears to exist.
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EVIDENCE-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-MISLEADIN-G INSTRUCTION-SOUTH-
ERN CAR & FOUNDRY Co. v. ADAMS, 32 So. 503 (ALA.).-ifeld, in an action
against a corporation that evidence as to defendant's financial condition for
determining punitive damages is inadmissable.
The English rule seems to be that evidence of wealth and rank is
admissible only in cases of breach of marriage promise. James v. Bidding-
ton, 6 Car. & P. 589. In this country, though there is direct conflict, the
tendency is to admit such evidence more freely, as in Pullman Pal. C. Co. v.
Lawrence, 74 Miss. SoS, where questions as to assets, dividends, etc., were
allowed, and Bennett v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 24. where recovery was increased
through influence of position and wealth. In Jones v. Jones, 7 Ill. 562, it
was held error to instruct a jury to consider defendant's pecuniary ability.
EVIDENCE-SUCCESSIVE VERDICTS CONTRARY TO.-McCANN v. NEW YORK
& I. C. R. R. Co., 76 N. Y. Surp. 684.-Four successive juries brought in
verdicts for the plaintiff. On appeal the verdicts of the first three juries
were set aside as contrary to the weight of evidence. Held, fourth verdict
will be sustained. McLaughlin and Ingraham, JJ., dissenting.
The court based its decision on the principle that a verdict contrary to
evidence is the result of bias, passion, prejudice or mistake. Morss v.
Sherill, 63 Barb. 21. It concluded that where four juries arrive at the
same conclusion all these reasons are dissipated. The prevailing opinion,
however, is that where justice has not been done, but the jury persists in
finding a wrong verdict, the duty of the court is to set it aside as often as
returned. Coffin v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 15 Pick 291, 295; M1dlIs v. Wieland,
68 Cal. 231, and cases cited.
EXTRADITION-FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE-PRESENCE INT DEMANDING STATE.
-PEOPLE V. HYATT, 64 N. E. 325 (N. Y.).-A requisition for the extra-
dition of a person not in the demanding State at the time of the commission
of the crime of larceny and false pretences, held, not valid on the ground
that his constructive presence did not constitute him a fugitive from justice.
Haight and Werner, JJ., dissenting.
In People v. Adams, 3 Denio 19o, the facts were the same as in this
case, but the opposite conclusion was reached. The question has never been
settled hy the U. S. Supreme Court. The only case hearing upon the
subject is Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183. It was there intimated that one
may commit an offense against a State upon whose soil he has never set
foot. This dictum cannot be taken to determine that the offender would
be a fugitive from justice. The weight of authority is clearly the other
way. State v. Hal!, 115 N. C. 811, 28 L. R. A. 289.
INJURY TO EMI.OEE-ORN.tNcrs-AssuM1'TION OF RISK.-IARTIN V.
Chicm\o, R. I. & P. R. Co., 91 N. W. 1034 (low.\.).--Whet a brakeman
enters into the employ of a raif 'td with the knowledge that in running
through a city the speed exceed, the rate dhom ed by ordinance. held, that lie
assumes the risk of such increa.zed speed. though injury arises from violation
of the ordinance.
The common law rule is tat an emphoyce wive., all right to dallages
when he continues in an tmployment obviously dangerous. Grcenleaf v.
Railroad Co., 29 Iowa 14. The breach of a stattite not for the protection
of the employee does not give him the right to damages, if injured. Meim-
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uing v. St. Paul D. R. Co., 27 Minn. III. The English courts, however,
hold that the maxim, "Volenti non fit injuria," does not apply when the
injury arises from a direct breach of a statutory obligation. Braddeley v.
Granville, L. R., ig Q. B. 423. This rule has been adopted in Illinois,
Missouri, Ohio and Indiana. There is also a difference of opinion when
the statute is for the protection of the employee. The English rule is that
the maxim has no application. Groves v. Lord Wimborne, 2 Q. B. 402.
The Massachusetts rule, which seems to be much the better, is that when an
employee continues in his employment, knowing that his employer is
breaking the statute, he waives all right to claim under the statute. O'Maley
v. South Boston Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135. Many States follow the
Massachusetts rule, including Iowa and New York. Ford v. Railway Co.,
io6 Iowa 85. Ryan v. Long Island Railroad, 5I Hun. 607.
INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTEREST-SOLE OWNERSHIP.-STEINMEYER V.
STEINMEYER, 42 S. E. 184 (S. C.).-Held, an insurance policy requiring
sole and unconditional ownership is not void when taken out by the grantee
of realty by deed of gift, though the deed has been adjudged void as
against the grantor's creditors.
The existence of a lien on property is not a breach of a condition
in a fire policy requiring sole and unconditional ownership in the assured.
Friezer v. Allernania Fire Ins. Co., 30 Fed. 352; Strong v. Manufacturer's
Ins. Co., 27 Mass. 40. Where fact of a pending litigation affecting the
premises insured was not communicated to the insurer at the time of
executing the policy, the policy is not thereby vitiated. Hill V. Lafayette
Ins. Co., 2 Mich. 476; Lang v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 74 Iowa 673.
LEaSLATIvE AUTHORITY TO ERECT STRUCTURES-ABUTTING 'OWNER'S
RIGHTS.-PAPE v. N. Y. & H. R. R- Co., 77. N. Y. SuPP. 725.-Defendant
by authority of the legislature constructed a viaduct in a public street
occupying more than the previous road-bed. The structure interfered with
the easements of light, air, and access of abutting property owners. Held,
such construction is a trespass. Van Brunt, P. J., dissenting.
The weight of authority upholds this decision. Reining v. R. R. Co.,
128 N. Y. 157. The governing principle was stated in Lewis v.-R. R. Co.,
162 N. Y. 202, that where easements are interfered with, even though by
governmental authority, the injured parties must be compensated. How-
ever, it was held in Fries v. R. R. Co., 169 N. Y. 270, that when a company
is obliged under act of the legislature to build a viaduct in place of
depressed cut, it commits no trespass in carrying out the work. But this
attempted distinction between a mandatory and a permissive statute, is
unsound when the rights of third parties are violated.
LIFE INSURANCE-SUICIDE-SANITY-RATONAL INTENT-SUPREME LODGE
MUT. PROTECTION v. GELBKE, 64 N. E. 1O58 (ILL).-Where there was an
agreement that the company should not be liable in case of insured's death
from suicide, sane or insane, held, that if the insured committed the act
causing his death voluntarily, understanding the physical nature of his act.
and intending to take his own life, the company was exempt whether th,
intent was rational or not.
The distinction pointed out in this case is generally accepted in the
United States. May, Ins. (3rd ed.), vol. I, secs. 307, 324; Bigelow v.
RECENT CASES. 177
Berkeshire L. Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284; De Gogorma v. Knickerbocker L.
Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 232. And where the stipulation "sane or insane" or its
equivalent is omitted the act is not suicide within the meaning of the
policy. Even though the insured intends his death, if by reason of insanity
he cannot appreciate the moral character of his act, or is impelled by an
uncontrollable impulse. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580; May, Ins. (3d ed.),
vol. I, sec. 307. In England the distinction is not recognized, and although
there is no clause as to insanity in the policy, still the act will be considered
suicide when done voluntarily, in the pursuance of an intelligent purpose,
even though by reason of insanity the insured cannot understand the moral
character of his act. Bowadaile v. Hunter, g M. & G. 639. English rule
is followed in Massachusetts. Cooper v. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 1O2 Mass.
227.
NEGLIGENCE-CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-INJURIES.-ToBENG V. METRO-
POLITAN ST. Ry. Co., 76 N. Y. SuPP. 4 i.-Plaintiff was injured by the
premature starting of a street car, which, while it was slowly moving, he
attempted to board. Held, that an instruction that, in all ordinary cases,
to attempt to board a moving public vehicle is negligent was erroneous.
The instruction expresses the established rule in the case of steam
railroads. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co. v. Texas R. R. Co., 36 Fed. 879; Bacon
v. Delaware R. R. Co., 143 Pa. St. 14. A distinction has often been made
where the motion was slight; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Kane, 64 Md. ii; al-
though the only decision to that effect in this country since 1894, Walthers v.
Chic. &I N. TV. R. R. Co., 72 Ill. App. 354, has been overruled. C. & A. R.
R. Co. v. Flaharty, 96 Ill. App. 563. But this rule does not apply to street
railroads; Corbin v. West End St. R. R. Co., 154 Mass. 197; and the de-
cisions to that effect are supported by abundant text authority. Shearm. &
Red., Neg., sec. 282; 3 Thomp., Neg., secs. 35, 65. Most of the cases cited
to uphold the opposite view involve some other element of negligence.
Dietrich v. St. R. R. Co., 58 Md. 347; Reddington v. Traction Co., 132 Pa.
St. 154.
NEGLIGENCE-DANGEROUS PREMISES-RAILROAD TURNTAULE.-C., B. & Q.
R. R. Co. v. KRAYENPUIIL, 91 N. W. 88o (NEB.).-A child of four years
was injured while playing on a turntable. Held, that the owners of the
turntable were negligent, in that it was not kept securely locked.
The general rule is that one who maintains on uninclosed premises
dangerous appliances of a nature likcly to attract children in play is liable
to a child injured thereby, although trespassing. R. R. Co. v. Stout. 17 Wall
657; R. R. Co. v. McDonald. 152 U. S. 262. The presence of the children
must have been reasonably anticipated. Phila., 'tc.. R. Co. T. Hum mcll,
44 Pa. St. 375. It has. on the other hand, been held that there is no liability
unless the negligence way be considered as equivalent to a wanton inj'ry.
Shea v. Gurnly, i63 "r;s. 184: lWalsh v. Fitchburg R. Co., 145 N. Y. 3oi.
And the general rule -i'ar ih're is no duty to trespassers has lLen applied
in the case of children. Ptcxrs s,. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345; Clark -.. Ua-
chester, 62 N. H. 577. As stated in the opinion, there i. a si-calei "'doctrine
of the turntable cases," in line with the present decision. R. iz. 7',. v. Stout
and R. R. Co. v. McDonald, supra. This has been af-med in Oh1.. Georgia,
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and several Western States, and repudiated in New York, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire. and New Jersey.
NOTES-VALIDITY-CONSIDERATION PARTLY ILLEGAL-DOUTHART V. CONG-
DON, 6.t N. E. 348 (ILL).-Where a city ordinance prohibited brokers from
doing business without a license, notes given to the brokers in settlement
of business transacted by them for the makers, including commission, were
held, absolutely void, the partial illegality of consideration vitiating the whole.
Where two or more notes are given for an indebtedness, part of which
was incurred for an illegal consideration, the law seems uncertain whether
the total amount should be vitiated or not. Carradine v. Wilson, 61 Miss.
573, rules that any note larger than the illegal consideration may be applied
thereto and recovery had on the others. When considerations can be sepa-
rated, recovery may be had pro tanto as far as it is founded on a valid'
consideration. Graves v. Safford, 41 Ill. App. 659. The court here, however,
has overlooked these distinctions and applied the well-established rule that
where part of the consideration is illegal the whole is void as being incon-
sistent with law and public policy. Scott v. Gillmorc, 3 Taunt. 226; Perkins
v. Cummings, 68 Mass. 258.
NUISANcE-AcTIoN By LESSEE-LANDLORD AND TENANT.-BLY V. EDISON
ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING Co., 64 N. E. 645 (N. Y.).-A tenant in possession
of premises injuriously affected by the operation of an electric lighting
plant can sue to abate the same, though the lease was made during the
existence of the nuisance. Parker, C. J., and Haight, J., dissenting.
This is the first departure of the New York courts from the doctrine
of Kernochan v. R. R. Co., 159 N. Y. 568. In that case it was held that a
tenant, who renewed his lease during the existence of a nuisance caused by-
an elevated railroad, could not bring an action to abate the same, for he
must be presumed to have accepted the lease at a lower rent. The court
refuses to place that construction on this case because it was not-intended
to be applied to the general law of nuisances, but to a condition created by
the operation of elevated railroads, which have no parallel in our juris-
prudence. The rule of the Kernochan case has been applied in New York
where the cause of the injury was a polluted stream(Yoos v. Rochester,
92 Hun. 48), and a tannery (Frances v. Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. 152). Also
in Massachusetts, where the injury was caused by an individual. Baker v.
Sanderson, 3 Pick. 348. The principal case, however, is well considered, and'
the distinction appears to be just and proper.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-PAYMENT OF UsuRious DEBT BY SuRETY--
ESTOPPEL OF PRINCIPAL.-BLAKELEY ET AL. v. ADAMS, 68 S. W. 473 (KY.).
-Held, that a principal is not estopped to set.up usury in the original debt,
when sued by the surety on a contract for indemnity, unless he stood by and'
permitted the surety to pay the debt in ignorance of the fact that it
contained usury. Paynter, Hobson and White, JJ., dissenting.
This decision seems unsupported by sound reason or authority. The
universal rule is that the principal is estopped to plead usury against his
surety, unless the surety was privy to the usury. Maples v. Cox, 74 Ga. 7O1;
Turman v. Looper, 42 Ark. 500. So where one became surety in ignorance
of usury in the debt, but paid with knowledge, he could recover of the
principal the whole amount paid unless he paid contrary to principal's order.
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Ford v. Keith, I Mass. 139. 'he ground of tlis decision is that the contract
for indemnity was without consideration, and that there was .. nierc sub-
stitution of the surety in place of the originl payee; and that such a mere
change of payee does not estop the debtor to plead nusry. Kendall v.
Crouch, 88 Ky. i99. But the dissenting justices point out that the payment
of the original debt, the loss of the use of his money by the s,'rety, and the
giving of time to the principal was sufficient consideration; Mann v. Bank,
io4 Ky. 852; and that the decision places the innocep: surety in a position
inferior to that of the mere assignee for value to whom the debtor has
renewed the obligation, since against him the debtor is estopped to plead
usury. Stone v. McConnell, 62 Ky. 54.
PRIVATE CORPORATION-INSOLVENCY-PREFERRING DIRECTORS.-NaPPANEE
CANNING Co. v. REID, MuRDocK & Co., 64 N. E. 870 (IND.).-Held, that an
insolvent private corporation may prefer its own directors, although their
%otes are necessary to accomplish the preference. Hadley, J., dissenting.
Several decisions support this doctrine without restriction; Warfield,
Howell & Co. v. Marshall & Co., 72 Ia. 666; Pleaters Bank v. Whittle,
78 Va. 737; others, with the qualification that the vote of the director pre-
ferred should not be necessary to secure the preference; Savage V. Miller.
s6 N. J. Eq. 432; or that the transaction be carefully scrutinized; Ilulings
v,. Hulings Lumber Co., 38 W. Va. 351; or that the act be considered prima
facie fraudulent. Schufeldt v. Smith. 131 Mo. 280. But the weight
of authority upholds the contrary. Smith v. Putnam. 61 N. H.
632; Atwater v. American Bank. 151 Ill. 605. Although the reason
generally advanced-that after insolvency, the directors are so far trustees
for the creditors as to preclude preference-is hardly sound. Bank v.
Lumber Co., go Mich. 345: Hollins v. Brierfield Co.. I5C V. S. 37I; XII
Yale Law Journal 63.
NUISANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF SUIBWAY-USE OF STRErTF.--ATES V.
HOLBROOK ET AL., 64 N. E. 181 (N. Y.).-Where .ub-constractors on the
New York City subway erect and maintain large ,.zorage strnc'ures which
cause serious loss to immediately neighboring hotel proprietors and same
could be as well maintained in sparsely settled districts or divided into
small buildings, held, that they constitute a nuisance. Parker. C. J, and
O'Brien, J.. dissenting.
The legality of erecting the structures was unquestioned; Laws T890,
c. 729. But taking all the facts into consideration, they were perinarent. ,-nd
under the dictum of Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. First Baptist Chur.-h to8
U. S. 317. constituted a niisance. Benefit to the public is m.,reoxer no
e.xcuF.. Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. -. Spa nger. 86 Md. 562.
REAL PIO1PERTY--INFANT's DEEIV-.\'",,I.N(.-SitI't v. McKLE El AL.,
32 So. 281 (M..).-Where a person remain, sim!nt regarding his deed
executed during infancy, held, that lie ln.. after reaching majority, the
entire period allowed by the statute of 1;nitations in which to ,lisalfi.-m.
This is contrary to the general rule that an infant's deed ius't be dis
affirmed within a reasonable time after majority. lPehtno s. llhzke, it Wend
(N. Y.) 85; Goodnow v. Empire Lumber Co.. 31 !Minn. 4 6S. Statutes have
been passed in at least two States to this same effect. Leacox V Griflith, 76
Iowa 89; Johnson v. Stoie, 32 Neb. 61o. l)ecihio..s in accord with the
case in hand, however. are common in some juris.lictions. H'ills v. Seixas,
24 Fed. 82; Prout Ir. Wiley, 28 Mich. 164.
